Email Babel: Does Language Affect Criminal Activity in Compromised
  Webmail Accounts? by Bernard-Jones, Emeric et al.
Email Babel: Does Language Affect Criminal
Activity in Compromised Webmail Accounts?
Emeric Bernard-Jones, Jeremiah Onaolapo, and Gianluca Stringhini
University College London
emeric.bernard-jones.15@ucl.ac.uk
{j.onaolapo,g.stringhini}@cs.ucl.ac.uk
Abstract—We set out to understand the effects of differing
language on the ability of cybercriminals to navigate webmail
accounts and locate sensitive information in them. To this end,
we configured thirty Gmail honeypot accounts with English,
Romanian, and Greek language settings. We populated the
accounts with email messages in those languages by subscribing
them to selected online newsletters. We hid email messages about
fake bank accounts in fifteen of the accounts to mimic real-world
webmail users that sometimes store sensitive information in their
accounts. We then leaked credentials to the honey accounts via
paste sites on the Surface Web and the Dark Web, and collected
data for fifteen days. Our statistical analyses on the data show that
cybercriminals are more likely to discover sensitive information
(bank account information) in the Greek accounts than the
remaining accounts, contrary to the expectation that Greek
ought to constitute a barrier to the understanding of non-Greek
visitors to the Greek accounts. We also extracted the important
words among the emails that cybercriminals accessed (as an
approximation of the keywords that they searched for within
the honey accounts), and found that financial terms featured
among the top words. In summary, we show that language plays a
significant role in the ability of cybercriminals to access sensitive
information hidden in compromised webmail accounts.
Keywords—webmail · honeypot · information theft · language
I. INTRODUCTION
Online accounts provide many useful functionalities but
also expose users to various risks, including information theft.
For instance, we send emails, edit online documents, and
network with colleagues via online accounts. Consequently,
these accounts not only provide these capabilities, but also
often become repositories of sensitive information, such as
passwords and financial information. Webmail accounts are
particularly “susceptible” to this, since they store private in-
formation by design. This makes them attractive to miscreants
that seek to make a fortune from the content of such accounts.
Data breaches and unauthorised account accesses are com-
monplace nowadays, usually at high financial and reputation
costs to victims and online service providers alike [1]. Cyber-
criminals usually compromise online accounts by performing
social engineering or phishing attacks on victims [2]. Other
ways by which cybercriminals obtain credentials and compro-
mise online accounts include database breaches,1 information-
stealing malware [3], and network attacks.2
After obtaining the credentials of online accounts, cyber-
criminals usually assess the value of the accounts by evaluating
1http://krebsonsecurity.com/2014/05/the-target-breach-by-the-numbers/
2http://codebutler.com/firesheep, http://crypto.stanford.edu/ssl-mitm
the content of the compromised accounts and searching for
sensitive information [4]. Depending on the perceived value of
the accounts, the miscreants then sell the account credentials
on the underground black market [5], or use them privately.
In some cases, the cybercriminals carry out further attacks
against the owners of such accounts, for instance by mount-
ing blackmail attacks against them, as seen in the Ashley
Madison online dating website scandal.3 In other cases, the
compromised accounts are used to attack other online users, for
instance sending spam messages to the contacts of the account
owner [5].
Existing literature on the use of compromised online ac-
counts by cybercriminals is sparse. This is primarily because
it is difficult to collect data on compromised accounts without
being in control of a large online service. Bursztein et al.
studied Gmail accounts that were compromised via phishing
attacks, to understand the modes of operation of cybercriminals
that gained illegitimate access to the accounts [4]. Similarly,
Onaolapo et al. studied the modus operandi of miscreants
accessing Gmail accounts leaked through multiple outlets [6].
Lazarov et al. investigated the activity of miscreants on leaked
online spreadsheets [7].
Online accounts often allow users to customise their
accounts in various ways, for instance, through language
localisation. This question then comes to mind – how do
cybercriminals behave when they encounter accounts in a
different locale or language? How will this affect their activity?
To the best of our knowledge, there is limited existing research
on this theme. To close this research gap, we studied the impact
of differences in account language on the activity of miscreants
that connect to compromised Gmail accounts.
To this end, we employed the infrastructure and methodol-
ogy proposed in our previous paper [6]. Hence, we created and
instrumented thirty Gmail accounts. We populated them with
email messages in three different languages, namely English,
Greek, and Romanian. We seeded fifteen of the accounts with
fake bank details containing keywords that are known to be
appealing to cybercriminals. We then leaked credentials to the
accounts through paste sites in the Surface and Dark Webs,
following the approach employed in previous work [6]. We
recorded accesses and activity in the accounts and carried out
statistical tests on the collected data.
We found that cybercriminals are more likely to discover
the fake bank account details hidden in the Greek accounts than
3https://blog.kaspersky.co.uk/cheating-website-hacked/
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the remaining accounts. This is contrary to the expectation that
Greek ought to constitute a barrier to the understanding of non-
Greek visitors to the Greek accounts. Previous work shows that
cybercriminals typically assess the value of stolen accounts by
searching for valuable information in them [4], [6]. Thus, we
postulate that the cybercriminals possibly used online language
translation tools to translate financial terms to Greek prior to
searching the Greek accounts for such keywords. This would
also explain the amount of time that they spent accessing the
accounts: Greek accounts recorded longer access times than
the rest, while English accounts recorded the lowest access
times. We present detailed results in Section IV.
Using Natural Language Processing (NLP) techniques, we
extracted important words from the emails that cybercriminals
accessed (as an approximation of the keywords that they
searched for within the honey accounts), and found that finan-
cial terms featured among the top words. This is interesting
because some of the sensitive words that we seeded the honey
accounts with also showed up among those important words.
This indicates that the cybercriminals paid particular attention
to those sensitive emails.
In summary, we found that language indeed affects the
ability of cybercriminals to locate sensitive information in
the honey accounts. Our statistical tests show that there is a
significant relationship between language and criminal activity
in webmail accounts. We also corroborate previous findings
that cybercriminals search for financial and other sensitive
information in compromised webmail accounts [4], [6].
Contributions. We provide detailed statistical analyses show-
ing that language differentiation affects the ability of cyber-
criminals to locate sensitive information in a compromised
webmail account. To the best of our knowledge, this is the
first study that explores the relationship between language and
criminal ability.
II. BACKGROUND
In this section, we discuss the categories of cybercrime,
webmail accounts, and the relationship between language and
criminal ability. Finally, we present our research questions and
hypotheses.
A. Categories of cybercrime
Broadly speaking, cybercrime is a term used to describe a
wide variety of instances within which technology is used or
involved in the execution of a criminal act [8]. It embodies a
variety of criminal activities (for instance, identity theft and
fraud), many of which are among the most rapidly advancing
crime types in many developed countries [9]. We discuss
the three distinct categories of cybercrime, namely cyber-
assisted crimes, cyber-dependent crimes, and cyber-enabled
crimes [10].
Cyber-assisted crimes. These are terrestrial crimes, such as
burglary or theft, which incorporate the use of digital technolo-
gies into the execution of a criminal act [11]. An example of
this is when a bicycle thief uses a mapping application to plan
a route through the area they already intended to steal from. In
cyber-assisted crime, the “cyber” element plays a tertiary role
in the execution of the crime itself, that is, the crime would
likely continue unaffected if the cyber element was removed.
This type of cybercrime is not in the scope of this paper, but it
is useful to note the extent to which advances in information
technology are able to influence terrestrial or physical crime
types.
Cyber-dependent crimes. These are crimes that can be exe-
cuted without the use of an internet connection, but use tech-
nology as a force multiplier to commit terrestrial crimes within
a “cyber-sphere” [12]. These crimes often take advantage of
the global reach of the Internet, but do not necessarily represent
entirely new crime types. A clear example is bank fraud which
existed before the Internet but has been greatly facilitated by
the growth of the Internet.
Cyber-enabled crimes. These represent the “cybercrime
archetype.” These crimes cannot be committed without the use
of an internet connection or computer network, for instance, a
Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attack [13].
Although debate exists regarding small differences and
measurement of these crime types [14], our intent in this
paper is not to provide detailed insight into crime types or
classifications. In this paper, we focus on cyber-dependent and
cyber-enabled crimes, since we study the actions of criminals
that access the contents of webmail accounts illegitimately.
B. Gmail accounts
Gmail accounts, like many other webmail accounts, al-
low users to send and receive text/multimedia messages to
one another. However, beyond sending and receiving email
messages, Gmail users can embed scripts in their accounts
to automatically carry out other activities, for instance, to
remind them about important emails that require attention. We
leveraged this functionality to instrument the Gmail accounts
that we used in our experiments, by configuring the scripts
to send us notifications about changes in the accounts (see
Section III-B).
After authenticating to their accounts, Gmail users can
access the email messages that other webmail users sent to
them in their Inbox folder. While composing email messages
in preparation for sending to other webmail users, those email
drafts appear in the Drafts folder. Similarly, they can access
the email messages that they previously sent to others in
the Sent folder. They can mark emails for later reference by
starring them. Gmail also provides a search tool for users to
enter search terms when looking for emails containing those
terms. Finally, Gmail users can change the display language of
their Gmail interface so that menu items, options, and text on
Gmail pages will be displayed in the selected language. This
is particularly useful for non-English Gmail users.
C. Language and crime
Research suggests that criminal activities are carried out
along familiar patterns of behaviour, spatially, by crime type, or
by the network of the actors [15]. This therefore suggests that
successful criminals rely heavily on a detailed understanding
of the processes surrounding the crimes they commit and the
areas within which they are committed [16]. Thus, we can
safely assume that their ability to understand and interpret
social cues, their environment, and the behaviour of their
victims has a knock-on effect on their ability to commit
crime [17].
While attempting to study the behavioural patterns of crim-
inals online, connecting to a webmail account and navigating
through it can be considered a “routine activity,” since these
are frequent online actions by legitimate users. Changes in
the composition, interface, layout, or language of the webmail
account can therefore be considered a barrier to the execution
of a crime in the account – much like a physical barrier (for
instance, a fence) may deter terrestrial crime. This forms the
thematic basis for our work.
Certain other aspects of criminal theory developed for
terrestrial crime types have shown promise in their ability to
be adapted to fit cybercrime types [18]. Even though ideas of
locality or geographical nodes from crime pattern theories may
need to be replaced with cyber equivalents, certain trends and
routine activities online have been successfully attributed to
specific online criminals [19].
There is a commonplace “truism” when discussing cy-
bercrime: that cybercrime is somehow unrestricted by the
same boundaries of time, space, and culture that may hinder
traditional crime types [20]. However, the majority of con-
tentions in previous work were made through logical inferences
and assertions. In particular, after exploring previous work in
the domains of crime sciences and language, we found very
little research exploring the relationship between language and
crime. This paper seeks to close that research gap and provide
insights into whether the execution of a criminal act is indeed
affected by language differences and comprehension or not.
To this end, we define our research question and hypotheses
as follows.
Research question. Does language differentiation affect cy-
bercriminal activity?
Hypothesis 0 (H0). Language differentiation will not have a
significant impact on the ability of cybercriminals to locate a
sensitive item in a compromised webmail account.
Hypothesis 1 (H1). Language differentiation will have a
significant impact on the ability of cybercriminals to locate
a sensitive item in a compromised webmail account.
III. METHODOLOGY
In this section, we describe the creation, population, and
seeding of the honey accounts. We also describe our method
of collecting data from the honey accounts.
A. Creating honey accounts
We created thirty honey accounts on the Gmail service
across three languages, namely English (ten accounts), Ro-
manian (ten accounts), and Greek (ten accounts). We chose
those languages for linguistic reasons; English because it is
an “international” language, Romanian because it is the only
Latin-based Eastern European language, and Greek because
it features a unique alphabet. In order to minimise potential
biases in our dataset, we configured the fake personas of the
honey accounts such that each linguistic group comprised five
men and five women, with birth dates ranging from 1960 to
Figure 1: Gmail gives users the option to change the display
language of its user interface. In addition to populating the
honey accounts with language-specific newsletters, we also
changed the display language of each honey account to match
its contents.
2000. We did this to make the accounts appear as believable
as possible by featuring a diverse persona set.
To populate the accounts, we subscribed them to over
fifty language-specific newsletters and mailing lists following
certain themes we had previously selected. The themes include
fashion, law, and gardening, and were picked according to the
gender and date of birth of the fake personas we developed
for the honey accounts. We also changed the display language
of each honey account to match the language of its content.
Figure 1 shows the Gmail language configuration option that
allows this.
Sensitive emails. In fifteen out of thirty honey accounts, we
hid fake online banking information. The idea was to mimic the
behaviour of webmail users that store sensitive information in
their accounts. To achieve this, we created screenshots of fake
bank account details and online banking pages (see Figures 3
and 4), and sent emails containing the screenshots to the honey
accounts themselves. For instance, for each honey account hG
in the accounts designated to contain sensitive information,
we sent the screenshots described earlier from hG to itself.
We used region-specific bank information while seeding the
accounts, for instance, fake Natwest and Santander information
for English accounts, fake ING information for Romanian
accounts, and fake Alpha Bank profiles for Greek accounts.
We did this to ensure that the banks would be instantly
recognizable in the countries of the honey account personas.
We also included keywords such as “national insurance num-
ber,”, “sort code,” and “account number” in the sensitive
emails. Such keywords have been shown to be attractive to
cybercriminals [4], [6]. Finally, we left the remaining fifteen
accounts unseeded as the control experiment.
B. Monitoring honey accounts
To monitor illegitimate activity in the honey accounts, we
used the infrastructure presented in our previous paper [6].
It comprises scripts embedded in the honey accounts, a
sinkhole email server, a notification store to receive activity
notifications from honey accounts, an email client to retrieve
email messages from the notification store, and some other
monitor scripts. Figure 2 shows an overview of the monitor
infrastructure.
The system provides us with information about activity in
honey accounts, specifically when emails are opened, sent, or
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Figure 2: Overview of the honeypot system.
Figure 3: An example of the fake banking details that we hid
in the English honey accounts.
starred. It also provides us with information about draft emails
created by visitors to the honey accounts. In addition, we
receive “heartbeat” messages daily from each honey account
to notify us about accounts that are active. We cease to receive
“heartbeat” messages from an account if it has been suspended
by Google, or if it was hijacked completely by cybercriminals,
that is, if they changed the account’s password. Finally, the
system provides us with information on accesses to the honey
accounts, that is, we receive IP address information, location
information, access times, and other details about visitors
interacting with the honey accounts. More details about the
infrastructure can be found in our previous paper [6].
To minimize the risk of abuse, we configured the honey
accounts’ default send-from addresses to point to an email
server which is part of the monitor infrastructure described
earlier. Hence, all emails sent from the honey accounts would
be delivered to our email server and not to the outside world,
since our email server is a sinkhole server (it does not forward
emails to the intended destination).
C. Leaking honey accounts
After instrumenting the honey accounts, we leaked their
credentials via paste sites on the Surface Web and the Dark
Web, namely on Pastebin, Insertor, and Stronghold.
Insertor, and Stronghold are Dark Web paste sites,
accessible only through special software, such as TOR browser.
Pastebin is accessible via any common web browser, for
instance Firefox, Chrome, or Safari. In each leak, we included
honey account credentials and messages indicating that the
credentials were obtained from hacked accounts. We recorded
accesses made to the honey accounts by miscreants and
analysed the resulting dataset. Details of our analysis can be
found in Section IV.
D. Threats to validity
It is important to mention that the monitoring infrastructure
we used in this study can only detect if an email was opened,
and not necessarily if it was read. For the purpose of this study,
we assume that opened emails were also read by the person that
opened them. In addition, we currently lack a way to determine
the exact words that were searched for in the honey accounts
by cybercriminals. Instead, we approximate those search terms
by evaluating important words in the emails that were opened
by the cybercriminals. We consider this the main threat to
the internal validity of this study. To minimize the impact
of this threat, we seeded the accounts with email messages
containing sensitive content (fake financial information) and
hid the emails, such that finding them would require some
effort by the cybercriminals. We then focused our analysis
on those sensitive emails. In future work, we hope to find
a more accurate way to determine search terms in the honey
accounts. Another threat to internal validity is that many of the
honey accounts were hijacked at least once by cybercriminals,
that is, the passwords of such accounts were changed. Recall
that we are unable to collect access and activity information
from a honey account when that happens. However, it is
important to note that we were able to recover some of the
accounts and continue the experiments. Finally, we leaked
account credentials through paste sites only, therefore, our
results may not necessarily reflect what happens when accounts
are compromised via other outlets.
E. Ethics
Due to the sensitive nature of our study, we ensured
that the experiments were carried out in an ethical manner.
Since the experiments require releasing account credentials to
cybercriminals, there is the risk of abuse. We minimized this
risk by configuring the honey accounts to send all outgoing
emails to an email server under our control, which does not
deliver the emails to their intended destinations. Thus, we were
able to prevent the accounts from being used to spam other
users. Also, we seeded the honey accounts with financial infor-
mation such as bank accounts and online banking information.
To avoid harming anyone, we ensured that all the financial
details loaded in the accounts were fake (we generated them
randomly). Finally, since our experiments involve deceiving
cybercriminals to engage with fake accounts, we obtained
ethics approval from our institution.
IV. DATA ANALYSIS
A Gmail account keeps records of each unique access
and labels the access with a unique identifier also known as
a “cookie,” along with other information about the access,
such as access time, IP address, and location. We extracted
this information from the honey accounts via our honeypot
infrastructure (cf. Section III). We also evaluated the actions
corresponding to those accesses (for instance, email opening,
sending, starring, or draft creation). In other words, each data
unit encapsulates an “access–action.”
Figure 4: An example screenshot of a fake online banking profile that we hid in the English honey accounts.
During our observation period of fifteen days, we observed
650 data units across 29 honey accounts from nineteen coun-
tries. We removed 210 of those data units from our dataset
(outliers) due to their undue effect on the distribution of the
data, bringing the overall total of individual data points to
440. The outliers comprise the data points that emanated from
cybercriminals that ran amok in the honey accounts, either
reading all emails in the affected accounts or performing a lot
of other actions. In this section, we present the results of sta-
tistical tests and textual analysis on the data. We establish the
relationship between language and cybercriminal ability, and
also show the keywords that cybercriminals were interested in.
A. Statistical tests
We coded the collected data into nine variables, namely
account name, language of account, email-subject, activity
performed, sensitivity of item accessed, IP address, location,
country, and duration of access. To determine whether a
relationship exists between language and cybercriminal func-
tionality, we ran a chi-squared (χ2) test [21] to assess any pos-
sible associations between discrete languages variables (Greek,
Romanian, and English), and the ability of the cybercriminal
to access a sensitive item.
The Pearson χ2 test (see Table I) shows that there is
indeed a significant association between language and the
ability of a cybercriminal to locate sensitive items within
an email account (χ2(2) = 15.3097, p < 0.001). Due
to the risk of inflation, we also generated a Cramer’s V
statistic [22] to reveal further information about the strength
of the association. This confirmed that there was a weak, yet
significant, association between language and cybercriminal
ability (V = 0.1865). However, it must be noted that χ2 tables
are relatively unable to provide more substantive information
regarding the interactions between the variables or the fit of the
model implemented. Thus, we carried out logistic regression
to further explore if a substantive relationship exists among
the three language variables and criminal activity (see Table
II). We found that the language variables, in combination,
significantly affected the ability of a cybercriminal to find a
sensitive item (χ2(3) = 19.77, p < 0.001), with the model
accurately predicting 81.59% of criminal action. Note that we
dropped the Romanian data points from the analysis in name
due to collinearity, and we henceforth refer to them as Cons
in subsequent analyses (that is, in Tables II, III, and IV).
Further analysis revealed a significant positive relationship
between the ability to locate a sensitive item and Greek
language sets (z = 2.52, p < 0.01) with an odds ratio of
2.316176, meaning that accounts established in Greek are
more than twice as likely to have a sensitive item accessed
than either of the other language sets. English language, as
a variable, was not significant, (z = −0.63, p = 0.530)
with an odds ratio of 0.8123249. This means that an account
being constructed in English actually lessens the chance of a
miscreant accessing a sensitive item in it. We obtained similar
results for the Romanian account set, which was significant
(z = −6.30, p < 0.01), with an odds ratio of 0.1888889.
This indicates that there is a significant negative relationship
between emails written in Romanian and the ability of a
criminal to locate a sensitive item in them.
We further introduced access duration as a variable into
logistic regression (see Table III). This is because we observed
that the mean of the average access rates for accounts across
languages varied; Greek accounts had the highest access times
on average while the English accounts had the lowest. This
might indicate further activity such as content translation to fa-
cilitate navigation through the honey accounts. Logistic regres-
sion with access duration included among the discrete language
variables was significant, accurately predicting 82.05% of
criminal activity, and accounting for a small level of variance
within the model (z = 2.17, p < 0.01). The access time
variable also had a slight positive effect on the significance
levels represented by the Greek and English variables, with an
English odds ratio of 0.8618208 (z = 0.45, p = 0.656) and a
Greek odds ratio of 2.345972 (z = 2.53, p < 0.01). However,
the Romanian variable suffered a corresponding decrease (odds
ratio 0.1589789) while still remaining significant (z = −6.56,
p < 0.01).
To re-affirm our findings, we mean-centered the access
duration values before running the model again to ensure that
the logistic model was not centering the access duration values
at an intercept with a value of 0, but rather a value integral
to the rest of the model (see Table IV). Mean-centering had
no effect on the fit of the model overall, other than marginally
improving the significance of the Romanian language variable
Table I: Chi-squared (χ2) analysis showing the differences between expected and actual criminal access to a sensitive item.
Not Sensitive Sensitive Total
Language Frequency ExpectedFrequency Frequency
Expected
Frequency Frequency
Expected
Frequency
English 189 177.9 29 40.1 218 218
Greek 80 93.8 35 21.2 115 115
Romanian 90 87.3 17 19.7 107 107
Total 359 359 81 81 440 440
Table II: Logistic regression assessing the relationship between language and criminal ability to locate a sensitive item.
Sensitive Odds Ratio Std. Err. z P > |z| 95% Confidence Interval
Lang–Eng 0.8123249 0.2690604 -0.63 0.530 0.4244168 1.554773
Lang–Gre 2.316176 0.7716938 2.52 0.012 1.205513 4.450116
Cons 0.1888889 0.049952 -6.30 0.000 0.1124876 0.3171816
Table III: Logistic regression including access durations.
Sensitive Odds Ratio Std. Err. z P > |z| 95% Confidence Interval
Lang–Eng 0.8618208 0.2878145 -0.45 0.656 0.4478668 1.658384
Lang–Gre 2.345972 0.7901058 2.53 0.011 1.212396 4.539428
Access 1.008337 0.0038651 2.17 0.030 1.00079 1.015941
Cons 0.1589789 0.0445502 -6.56 0.000 0.091793 0.27534
Table IV: Logistic regression with mean centralised access durations.
Sensitive Odds Ratio Std. Err. z P > |z| 95% confidence Interval
Lang–Eng 0.8618208 0.2878145 -0.45 0.656 0.4478668 1.658384
Lang–Gre 2.345972 0.7901058 2.53 0.011 1.212396 4.539428
C–Access 1.008337 0.0038651 2.17 0.030 1.00079 1.015941
Cons 0.1804734 0.0482639 -6.40 0.000 0.1068506 0.3048244
(z = −6.40, p < 0.01), resulting in the final odds ratio of
0.1084737.
Since these results clearly demonstrate that there is a
significant relationship between language and cybercriminal
ability, we reject our null hypothesis H0. In the next section,
we present our findings on the items that cybercriminals
searched for in the honey accounts.
B. Digging for webmail “gold”
We wanted to understand the themes and words that cyber-
criminals search for when they access compromised webmail
accounts. Previous research has shown that one of the first
steps of cybercriminals after compromising an online account
is to assess its value by going through its contents [4]. This
implies that they run certain search queries to locate email
messages of interest to them. However, we did not have access
to the search terms in the honey accounts since there is
currently no API to retrieve such information from the honey
accounts. To overcome this limitation, we approximated the
search terms by analysing the opened emails and extracting
the important words in them, relative to all the emails in the
honey accounts. To achieve this, we used Term Frequency–
Inverse Document Frequency (TF-IDF) analysis, following the
method outlined in our previous paper [6].
For each language set (English, Greek, Romanian), con-
sider dR as the corpus of all opened emails in the honey
accounts of that language, while dA is the corpus of all emails
in the inboxes of those accounts. We removed all words that
had less than five characters from the corpus, and also removed
signalling and header information, for instance “charset.” We
obtained tfidfR and tfidfA as the resulting vectors of words
and their probabilities after performing TF-IDF analysis on
the text corpus [dR, dA]. We further computed the vector
tfidfR−tfidfA. The idea is that words with higher tfidfR−tfidfA
values have higher importance in the set of emails opened
by miscreants, relative to the entire corpus. Thus, such words
reveal the themes that the cybercriminals were likely searching
for.
Tables V, VI, and VII show the results of TF-IDF analysis
on English, Greek, and Romanian honey accounts respectively.
They show that those who accessed the Greek and Romanian
accounts attempted to search for words outside the linguistic
confines of the accounts. For instance, the word “posted”
appeared to be the most searched word in both the Greek
and Romanian accounts. The terms searched in the Romanian
accounts did not include any financial or banking indicators,
whereas the TF-IDF search approximation for the Greek
accounts includes words such as τράpiεζας (bank) and κωδικός
(code). Both words are among the sensitive terms that we
used to seed the accounts beforehand, as earlier described
in Section III-A. On a related note, financial terms such as
“banking” and “investment” appear among the top TF-IDF
words in the English accounts (see Table V). These findings
show that cybercriminals indeed searched for financial terms in
the honey accounts. This result is further strengthened by the
observation that the terms found to be important in the entire
email text dA are not important in the corpus of opened emails
dR (as shown by the low tfidfR−tfidfA values, some of which
are negative). This is a strong indicator that the opened emails
were not selected randomly by the cybercriminals, rather, they
were opened deliberately after searches were conducted for
Table V: TF-IDF results for the English language variant.
Searched words tfidfR tfidfA tfidfR−tfidfA Common words tfidfR tfidfA tfidfR−tfidfA
written 0.4371 0.04322 0.3938 unsubscribe 0.109 0.1833 -0.0743
question 0.447 0.0678 0.3796 click 0.0953 0.1671 -0.0718
answer 0.2283 0.0377 0.1907 please 0.0931 0.1597 -0.0666
commission 0.2224 0.0386 0.1838 about 0.0761 0.1279 -0.0518
union 0.2273 0.0565 0.1708 service 0.0394 0.1248 -0.0854
european 0.2508 0.088 0.1628 twitter 0.0257 0.1193 -0.0936
source 0.2267 0.0663 0.1604 trump 0.0399 0.1085 -0.0685
banking 0.1599 0.0394 0.1205 london 0.2158 0.1017 -0.1141
london 0.2158 0.1017 0.1141 contact 0.0465 0.1001 0.0536
investment 0.0548 0.0122 0.0425 health 0.0717 0.0983 -0.026
Table VI: TF-IDF results for the Greek language variant.
Searched Words tfidfR tfidfA tfidfR−tfidfA Common Words tfidfR tfidfA tfidfR−tfidfA
posted 0.1233 0.0002 0.1230 alpha 0.0830 0.4820 -0.3990
βιβλίο, 0.1182 0.0003 0.1179 αγόρασέ 0.1358 0.0809 0.0549
ίδρυμα 0.0906 0.0007 0.0899 ekdromi.gr 0.1258 0.0624 0.0634
κωδικός 0.0830 0.0079 0.0751 hotel 0.0704 0.0608 0.0096
τράpiεζας 0.0830 0.0001 0.0829 newsletter 0.0453 0.0560 -0.0107
όνομα, 0.0830 0.0006 0.0825 εικόνα 0.0629 0.0483 0.0146
γιάννης 0.0805 0.0014 0.0791 έκδοση 0.0528 0.0470 0.0058
subscribed 0.0780 0.0013 0.0767 διαθέσιμη 0.0478 0.0454 0.0024
states 0.0755 0.0001 0.0754 column 0.0453 0.0392 0.0061
united 0.0755 0.0001 0.0753 outlook 0.0428 0.0322 0.0106
Table VII: TF-IDF results for the Romanian language variant.
Searched Words tfidfR tfidfA tfidfR−tfidfA Common Words tfidfR tfidfA tfidfR−tfidfA
posted 0.2307 0.0011 0.2296 click 0.1567 0.2693 -0.1127
charm 0.1481 0.0038 0.1443 multe 0.1253 0.2238 -0.0984
dimensiune 0.1424 0.0024 0.1401 E´TMte 0.0541 0.1470 -0.0928
greutate 0.1424 0.0045 0.1379 adresa 0.0741 0.1436 -0.0696
numar 0.1339 0.0093 0.1245 romania 0.0427 0.1161 -0.0734
cutiuta 0.1253 0.0017 0.1237 online 0.0627 0.1118 -0.0491
livreaza 0.1253 0.0019 0.1234 video 0.0968 0.1085 -0.0117
argint 0.1310 0.0103 0.1207 dintre 0.0826 0.1037 -0.0211
material 0.1253 0.0068 0.1185 dezabonare 0.0370 0.0992 -0.0622
produsul 0.1253 0.0089 0.1164 iulie 0.0826 0.0991 -0.0165
those terms. This further corroborates findings from previous
work [4], [6].
V. DISCUSSION
In this section, we provide a summary of our findings and
the limitations of our approach. Finally, we discuss potential
future work.
Summary of our findings. Contrary to our expectations, our
findings show that cybercriminals are more likely to locate
sensitive information in the Greek accounts than accounts
in the other languages. This is rather intriguing, especially
since only two of the accesses we observed originated from
Greece or Greek-speaking countries. We recognize that some
accesses to the accounts may have been made through proxy
servers. However, it is clear that those who visited the accounts
were not solely Greek-speaking individuals. These findings
run contrary to the ideas espoused in theories of language
comprehension and understanding, which suggest that individ-
uals should be significantly hindered in their comprehension
if they do not understand the language of the object they are
interacting with. Thus, we postulate that the cybercriminals
possibly used online language translation tools to translate
financial terms to Greek prior to searching the Greek accounts
for such keywords. This would also explain the amount of
time that they spent accessing the accounts: Greek accounts
recorded longer access times than the rest, while English
accounts recorded the lowest.
Miscreants spend more time on average going through
the Greek and Romanian accounts. This indicates a number
of possibilities. As earlier stated, cybercriminals may spend
more time on the accounts to incorporate the use of online
translation services to improve their limited understanding of
email content, thus spending more time on those accounts.
Alternatively, it may be because individuals are more readily
able to assess the contents of a webmail account whose
content language is English, and consequently disregard such
an account if it appears to be of limited value.
Finally, the implementation of a way to search for key-
words in the content of an email account may be a key factor
in the ability of a criminal to traverse a compromised webmail
account, as seen in our TF-IDF evaluation which highlighted
words such as “bank” and “code.” This suggests that it might
be possible for webmail service providers to hamper criminal
elements from finding sensitive information in compromised
accounts by obfuscating or removing keywords relating to
banking or financial matters.
Limitations. First, we were able to leak the honey accounts
through paste sites only. Hence, our results may not reflect
what happens to accounts that are compromised via other
outlets. Second, our approach relies on TF-IDF to approximate
search terms in the honey accounts. As a result, we only
have insight into searches whose results were opened by the
miscreants. We are unable to assess searches that did not return
results, and searches that returned results which the miscreants
did not open.
Future work. In the future, we intend to explore the use of
compromised online accounts in other scenarios, for instance,
in targeted attacks. We also intend to study the impact of
language differentiation on cybercriminal activity on other
platforms, for instance online social networks, cloud storage
accounts, and online banking accounts.
VI. RELATED WORK
Bursztein et al. [4] studied the use of compromised Gmail
accounts in the wild, with specific focus on spearphishing as
a way by which cybercriminals obtain account credentials.
They deployed Gmail honeypots and collected data from them.
In our previous paper [6], we used a similar honeypot ap-
proach to investigate the use of compromised Gmail accounts,
but explored more outlets, namely paste sites, underground
forums, and malware. We also presented a public honeypot
infrastructure, which we used in this paper. Other researchers
have used honeypot systems to study the use of compromised
online accounts as well. Liu et al. [23] placed honey credentials
(inside honey files) in P2P shared spaces to study illegitimate
accesses. Nikiforakis et al. [24] also studied privacy issues
in file hosting systems using honeyfiles. Stringhini et al. [25]
deployed honeypot profiles to study social spam. Other studies
exploring the misuse of online accounts include [26]–[29].
They focus on the abuse of online accounts, while we focus the
effect of language differentiation on the ability of cybercrimi-
nals that attempt to abuse webmail accounts and steal sensitive
information.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we studied the impact of language differenti-
ation on the activity of cybercriminals accessing compromised
webmail accounts. We created, deployed, and leaked thirty
honey accounts across three languages, namely English, Greek,
and Romanian. We collected and analysed data about accesses
and activity from the honey accounts for fifteen days. Our tests
revealed a significant relationship between language and the
ability of a cybercriminal to access a sensitive item (that we
seeded the account with). Finally, we presented the results of
our analysis on the contents of the honey accounts. We found
that cybercriminals indeed searched for sensitive financial
information in the accounts. We hope our findings will help the
research community to gain deeper insight into the relationship
between language and cybercriminal activity, and potentially
provide insight into ways to develop effective techniques to
detect illegitimate activity in online accounts.
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